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I. Introduction 
 
British government policy over the past thirty years has seen a movement away from 
universal provision of welfare towards the targeting of welfare1. Budget constraint 
considerations have provided the driver for this movement while efficiency considerations 
have provided the rationale for this policy shift. The advent of devolution in Scotland, and to 
a lesser degree Wales, has however created new policy forums in which the shift towards 
targeted benefits has been questioned and even reversed in a number of important fields. 
Scotland has seen a limited movement back towards universal entitlement with the abolition 
of up-front tuition fees for higher education and the introduction of free personal care to the 
elderly. Similarly, proposals for the universal provision of free school meals currently put 
forward to the Scottish Parliament represents a further attempt to reintroduce the principle of 
universality into the provision of welfare. While many, particularly within Scotland, may be 
highly critical of the extent to which the reversal of targeting in favour of universality has 
occurred and the extent to which these shifts represent a movement towards income 
redistribution within the population, they nevertheless reflect a real and significant departure 
from current government policy on the importance of targeted welfare provision. 
 
Welfare provision in relation to children is a further key area in which this policy debate has 
emerged. The distribution of household resources within families has been the focus of 
attention highlighted by the continued link between household poverty and childhood and 
more recent concerns over the extent of diet-related ill health, particularly among children2. 
Thus the debate over the importance of universal versus targeted welfare provision has been 
intensified when specifically related to children, whose only access to welfare is though the 
intermediary of a parent or carer claimant. Local authority initiatives aimed at providing 
welfare direct to the recipient via providing universal provision for children, including 
school-based free breakfast clubs and pilot projects for free school meals is thus further 
evidence of this shifting balance between universal and targeted benefit provision. 
 
This paper looks at the issue of universality and targeting in relation to household income and 
size by examining the impact of the proposal for the introduction of universal free school 
meals to all children in full-time state education. The Free School Meals Bill submitted to the 
Scottish parliament in 2002 aimed to introduce a universal provision to all children of school 
age in state education. Using the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) the paper provides 
evidence on the impact on household income for differing income groups arising from a 
                                                 
∗ Corresponding author : Dr. Carlo Morelli, Department of Economic Studies, University of Dundee, Dundee. 
DD1 4HN. email : c.j.morelli@dundee.ac.uk 
1 Universal is defined here as welfare which is provided independently of either employment or claimant status 
whereas targeted is defined as welfare requiring the claimant to satisfy particular, usually income based, criteria 
for receipt of the benefit. 
2 See Scottish Executive Hungry for Success initiative as an example. 
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universal benefit such as free school meals. While we choose free school meals as our 
example the impact of most universally applied monetary benefits, or indeed non-monetary 
benefits, could be considered using the methodological approach and dataset adopted in this 
paper. Thus the paper compares the existing system of welfare to a number of alternative 
systems that have been proposed, using changes in Gini coefficients to demonstrate the 
impact of changing the system of welfare provision used. In addition to both no provision and 
universal provision systems, the analysis considers a more focused targeting system (under 
the alternative assumptions of fixed and variable budgets). The paper therefore provides a 
general case of a universal benefit aimed at child welfare, either mediated through household 
income or via the provision of a welfare provision direct to children, indeed identical to child 
benefit itself. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section II we outline the context in which the provision of 
universal welfare emerged and examines the policy debate which underlay the shift away 
from universality towards targeting. In so doing the paper demonstrates that welfare policy 
has always been limited by the conflict created between the desire to reduce poverty and the 
desire to limit the costs of the Welfare State. In Section III we then discuss the nature of the 
data used in the study and the methodology employed. This is then followed in Section IV by 
the results for the increase in benefit measured as the percentage increase of equivalent 
household income and the changes to gini coeffients derived from alternative methods of 
welfare provision. Finally, in Section V we conclude by exploring the importance of our 
findings for the current debate on universality versus targeting in welfare provision. 
 
II. The Rise and Fall of Universality 
 
The late-1970s saw a significant change in the patterns of child poverty. Child poverty had 
declined through the period from 1945 until the 1960s but rose rapidly from the late-1970s. 
By 1968 child poverty rates had fallen to around 1 in 10, approximately 1.4 million children, 
while by 1995-6 child poverty had risen to 1 in 3, approximately 4.3 million children (Greg, 
Harkness & Machin, 1999, p.163). This re-emergence of high levels of child poverty was not 
simply a reflection of changes in relative poverty levels but reflected the stagnation of 
absolute household income for households with children against rises in average living 
standards since the late-1980s. Thus child poverty resulted from a widening disparity 
between household incomes for those with and those without children. 
 
These changes were remarkable not simply for the rapidity with which they emerged but also 
because of the long term trends which they reversed. Universality was a central theme in the 
introduction of the welfare reforms of the 1940s, beginning with the 1944 Education Act that 
introduced compulsory free secondary education for all children under 15 years of age. 
Similarly, the introduction of cash benefits, paid to all mothers, for families with two or more 
children were introduced with the 1946 Family Allowances Act and extended in 1975 under 
the Child Benefit system to mothers with one child (Barr & Coulter, 1990, p.280). While 
these acts focused specifically on children they were combined with the Industrial Injuries 
Act, the National Insurance Act and the National Health Service Act to became what is 
known collectively in Britain as the Welfare State. 
 
The creation of the Welfare State needs to be understood in the terms in which it was 
introduced. The welfare measures introduced were not motivated by desires for wealth 
redistribution but at providing minimum standards, on a national basis, in order to deal with 
effects of the five ‘giants’ that had been the centre of debate in the interwar depression; 
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namely want, disease, ignorance, squalor and idleness (Fraser, 1989, 207-39). While William 
Beveridge’s 1942 report argued for the need of minimum standards and the adoption of 
universality as a means of their creation the Benthamite utilitarian distinction between a 
deserving and non-deserving poor continued. Thus central to the provision of welfare was the 
ideological commitment to an insurance-based system of welfare entitlement and the self-
financing of pension provision. As a result the targeting of welfare through means testing, 
though of reduced importance during the 1940s and 1950s, was never completely abolished. 
 
In addition to dealing with the effects of the five giants there was an early recognition of the 
legacy of ill-health in Britain after 1945 and the budgetary constraints addressing this legacy 
imposed on government. While much of the apparent rise in welfare costs simply reflected 
the transfer of welfare provision from local to national government, and the limitations of 
government forecasting, there was nonetheless a real growth in total welfare expenditure 
(Crowther, 1988, Table 1). For example, for the National Health Service’s first full year of 
operation costs had been projected to be £259m while in reality they came in at £358m, and 
by 1952 estimates and final costs were just below £400m (Stirling-Ross, 1952, appendix). At 
the same time the compulsory contributory insurance scheme, introduced to contribute 
towards the costs of the National Health Service, barely raised 13% of the costs at its 
inception and declined from then on. Thus means testing was incrementally reintroduced very 
early on due to budgetary constraints with prescriptions and dental treatment becoming 
subject to charges following the passage of the 1952 National Health Service Act (Stirling-
Ross, 1952, 383). 
 
A growing awareness of the cost of welfare saw further movements back towards increased 
means testing during the 1950s and 1960s as the government acted to limit the extent of 
provision. This was reinforced by a government acceptance that the costs of old age pensions 
would be funded by pay-as-you-go taxation, in the form of National Insurance rather than 
through a self-financed insurance-based system. Nevertheless, the commitment to 
universality of welfare remained broadly intact with just the level at which minimum 
standards were set being moved. The impact of these changes were such that by 1973, 
although the lowest decile income group had an income level before benefits of only 6.7% of 
the next lowest decile, after benefits were included their income rose to 86.7% of the next 
lowest decile’s income (Glennerster, p.25). 
 
While changes to the welfare system in the mid-1970s initially sought to further the impact of 
universal provision it was the rising cost of mass unemployment and its welfare provision 
cost, with welfare expenditure rising from 50.5% of government expenditure in 1973-4 to 
55.7% of expenditure in 1977-8, that saw a rapid reversal of the universalistic approach (Le 
Grand, 1990, p.339). In 1978 the Supplementary Benefits Review explicitly linked the 
continued provision of welfare to the extension of means testing. Debate on welfare provision 
was now increasingly linked to its role in changing preferences and its reputed failure in 
creating a ‘dependency culture’. The 1980s thus saw the return of nineteenth century 
language distinguishing the deserving and undeserving poor (Lowe, 1993, 314). In response 
government policy towards welfare provision now focused upon seeking mechanisms for 
intensifying market signals and encouraging incentives for recipients to enter the labour 
market. This change in ideological approach to welfare resulted in a number of important 
changes in welfare provision in the 1980s. Most importantly, the income-related aspect of 
many benefits, including unemployment and invalidity benefits was removed, pensions were 
now calculated on lifetime earnings, rather than the best twenty years, while their increases 
were tied to retail price inflation rather than earnings. Similarly, Family Credit, introduced in 
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1988, became a mechanism for topping up household income for those in low paid work 
(Webb, 1995, 19). 
 
Despite these restrictions Lowe (1993, 319) and Le-Grand (1990, 350) point to the welfare 
state’s continued importance, and even growth in the period, as evidence of its resilience and 
the social stability achieved in Britain, particularly during the industrial turmoil of the 1980s, 
as evidence of its success in its role as a safety net. However, more recent work has 
highlighted its inability to deal with the demographic changes taking place since the mid-
1970s. 
 
The re-emergence of high levels of child poverty in Britain during the 1980s derived from the 
rapid rise in income inequality, which in Britain rose faster than an other OECD country 
(Machin, 1996). Demographic change, with the growth of in diversity of employment status 
and household composition played an important part in these changes. Households were, 
unlike the period when the welfare state emerged, no longer characterised by relatively 
homogenous ‘nuclear’ households and were less and less likely to correspond to the pattern 
of a household with a single wage earner. Instead the number of single earners per family fell 
from 68% of households in 1961-63 to just 32% of households by 1991-93. Over the same 
period the numbers with two wage earners rose from 28% to 55% while, most significantly 
for welfare, the numbers with no wage earner rose from just 4% to 13% (Webb, 1995, figure 
2). 
 
Just as the employment status of those in households changed dramatically so to did the 
composition of households themselves. Between 1971 and 1991 the proportion of single 
parent families rose from 8% to 19% of families with children and at the other end of the age 
range, those of pensionable age rose from 11.4% of the population in 1941 to 16.5% by 1991 
(Hills, 1993, 31-33).3
 
It is these demographic changes that have had a significant effect on poverty rates. Most 
importantly it is the incidence of workless households and the growth of part-time work for 
women which has had the greatest impact on the rise in child poverty rates. Over 53% of 
children living in poor households have no adult working, while less than 12% of poor 
children live in households with a parent working full time whose earnings are above the 
bottom quartile (Gregg, Harkness & Machin, 1990). 
 
It is here that much recent work has highlighted the limitations of welfare policy. Gregg, 
Harkness & Machin (1999) highlight both the extent of household poverty where households 
include children and the inequality of expenditure on children for households in poverty. 
Thus Greg, Harkness & Machin maintain that: 
 
‘it is nevertheless clear that rising trends in child poverty measured on an income basis 
are also reflected in a wider dispersion of expenditures. As a consequence of a more 
pronounced incidence of low incomes, a large, and increasing, proportion of children are 
also losing out in terms of what is spent on them.’ (Gregg, Harkness & Machin, 1999, 
186) 
 
Elsewhere, Brewer, Clark & Goodman (2003) conclude, pessimistically and critically, on 
government attempts to reduce the levels of child poverty through welfare provision. In 
                                                 
3 Pensionable age refers to women over 60 and men over 65 years of age. 
 4
examining the effect of welfare policy under the Labour government’s first term of office 
they conclude that; 
 
‘child poverty has declined under Labour … it has fallen by far less than was widely 
predicted. Both parts of this conclusion are robust both to the likely sampling error and 
to the precise poverty line used. Indeed, the Government’s chosen poverty line (60% of 
the median income) has actually allowed a somewhat larger percentage point reduction 
in poverty than would have shown up under either the traditional British poverty measure 
(50% mean) or any alternative fraction of the median’. (Brewer, Clark & Goodman 2003, 
F257) 
 
Thus the Blair government not only failed to deliver the reduction in child poverty 
campaigners and academics, interested in poverty reduction, had hoped for but that the 
government, cynically perhaps, chose the measure of change which showed the changes that 
did take place in the most optimistic light. 
 
Finally, in examining the link between childhood poverty, adult educational attainment and 
limiting illness Benzeval, Taylor & Judge (2000) highlight two important relationships, 
namely that childhood poverty may result in adults being up to four times more likely to have 
no qualifications and that childhood poverty results in adults being up to twice as likely to 
have a limiting illness compared with better off children (Benzeval, Taylor & Judge, 2000, 
384-5). They conclude that childhood poverty is strongly related to educational achievement. 
Further, they find that parental education and family composition both act as predictors of 
health outcomes for children and that poverty is a strong predictor of health and, finally, that 
these effects are long-lasting with childhood circumstances being linked to adult health 
outcomes. 
 
Thus child poverty has effects beyond those immediately identifiable on the child itself and is 
linked to outcomes in adulthood and, indeed, may be transferred across generations. The 
issue of the relationship between welfare provision and childhood poverty has as a result, and 
not surprisingly, become central to current considerations on welfare. 
 
In the analysis that follows we confirm the connection between household composition and 
childhood poverty, and demonstrate that the current system of free school meals provision is 
not only inadequate in terms of reducing inequality, as it fails to benefit large numbers of the 
very poorest in society, but we go on to show that as a mechanism for reducing inequality it 
is barely an improvement on no provision at all (the current system is primarily based on the 
criteria that recipients must be in households in receipt of either Income Support or Income-
Related Job Seekers’ Allowance). Consequently, we examine alternative systems of free 
school meal provision. Thus, we demonstrate the advantages of universal free school meal 
provision against a range of selection criteria for a more rational system of means testing than 
that used in the current, flawed system (this more rational system is based on the household’s 
position within the income distribution, rather than receipt of a particular form of benefit 
payment, which may be only a poor proxy for household poverty4). Finally, in recognition of 
                                                 
4 The natural consequence of this alternative model of means testing is that the benefit is concentrated within the 
poorest families such that it minimises inequality. We acknowledge that this form of redistribution would not be 
possible for a school meal type benefit unless the qualifying child received two or more free school meals per 
day or we associated receipt of increased benefit with an increase in the quality of benefit. However, it would be 
more directly applicable if the benefit was a monetary benefit provided to the family, as could happen with other 
forms of welfare benefit. 
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the fact that free school meal provision may have to operate within a fixed budget, we 
examine the impact of means testing using this more rational system of means testing, 
comparing the results with the current, flawed system, thereby demonstrating the inefficiency 
of the current system. 
 
III. The Data and Methodology 
 
The empirical analyses presented in this paper utilises data drawn from the twelfth (2002) 
wave of the British Household Panel Study (BHPS), the latest available at the time of this 
study. This dataset, drawing respondents from all four constituent parts of the United 
Kingdom, seeks to interview all adults within a household5. The data collection process 
elicits both household level and individual level data from its respondents, and in this twelfth 
wave of the data we have usable information on 9,346 households. The analyses that follow 
are at the household level rather than the individual level. 
 
The data collected from each household is a particularly rich source of data for this analysis. 
Included in the detailed household composition data are the ages of all household members 
and their relationship to one another, along with monthly income data disaggregated by 
source (the fine detail of this income data indicates which welfare benefits are received, 
enabling us to ‘reconstruct’ the current system of free school meal provision based around the 
receipt of either Income Support or Income-Related Job Seekers’ Allowance). 
 
As can be seen from the raw data in Table 1, there exists an interesting pattern between the 
average level of monthly household income and household size. While average household 
income rises as household size rises from no children to two children, its rate of increase falls 
dramatically. Thus, the increase in average monthly household income falls from £690 to £65 
as we move from having no children to one child, and then from one child to two children. 
Households with two children see a significant drop in the standard deviation of monthly 
household income as it becomes concentrated in a narrower distribution around the average. 
This is most likely explained by women dropping out of the labour market, or taking lower 
paid part-time work, as households become less capable of caring for two children while both 
partners continue to work full-time. Still more startling is the fact that as households move 
from having two children to having three or more children, average monthly household 
income declines by £141 per month, while the standard deviation of monthly household 
income also increases again. Thus, the raw data highlights both a wide disparity of incomes 
for larger households and still more startlingly a falling average monthly household income 
relative to smaller households. A higher proportion of larger households therefore face a 
significant problem of poverty6. 
 
                                                 
5 Thus, all adults within a household are interviewed, even if the household includes more than one family; This 
helps to explain why there are a very small number of high-earning households in receipt of income support. 
6 This data alone suggests that the current system of reduced Child Benefit for the second and subsequent child, 
compared to the higher level of Child Benefit for the first child, is almost certainly regressive and therefore 
exacerbates child poverty. 
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Table 1 : Distribution of Monthly Household Income by Family Composition 
Number of 
children in 
household 
Number of 
households 
Maximum 
household income 
Average 
household income 
Standard deviation 
of household 
income 
0 6,298 £33,008 £1,827 £1,607 
1 1,279 £61,323 £2,517 £2,357 
2 1,208 £21,012 £2,582 £1,848 
3 or more 561 £34,432 £2,441 £2,363 
 
Such raw data, however, under-estimates the variable costs of raising children and as a result 
research on household income, expenditure and poverty adjusts for the differential costs of 
living for households of varying size. Housing and food costs, for example, will typically be 
much greater for larger households than smaller households. Therefore, without correction 
for household composition effects, household income data may be misleading, such that 
poorer large households could appear more affluent than richer small households. Thus, 
correcting for household composition effects was the first stage in our analysis.  We 
calculated, for each household, their monthly pre-tax income (encompassing all income 
sources). This household income data was then adjusted, using the ‘McClements Scale’, for 
differences in household composition to generate a measure of equivalent household income. 
We therefore discuss the changes in poverty on the basis of analysis using this equivalent 
household income data7. 
 
The McClements score rises as (a) the number of household members rises and (b) as the 
composition of the household shifts towards those member types with a higher cost of living, 
most typically adults. For a household incorporating just a couple the McClements score is 
one. Larger, more costly households, would have a McClements score greater than one while 
smaller, less costly households, would have a McClements score less than one. The raw 
monthly income data was corrected by dividing it by the McClements score, thus making 
single person households appear more affluent, and multiple person households appear less 
affluent, than is implied on the basis of just the raw household income data alone. 
 
Table 2 below shows the distribution of this McClements-adjusted monthly income data 
against the unadjusted data8. The impact of these adjustments is to decrease the apparent 
disparity between the lowest and highest mean household incomes (at lower deciles the 
McClements adjustment ‘raises’ income, while at higher deciles the McClements adjustment 
‘reduces’ income). 
 
                                                 
7 See Appendix One for further discussion of the McClements Scale and the construction of the equivalent 
household income data. 
8 Note that the deciles utilised in Table 2 are calculated on the basis of the raw, unadjusted income data. In 
subsequent analyses the deciles are calculated on the basis of the McClements Score adjusted income data. 
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Table 2 : Average monthly income (raw income data and McClements Score adjusted data) 
by decile 
Decile Raw income data McClements Score 
adjusted income data 
Percentage gain / loss 
due to adjustment 
1 (lowest) £246 £328 +33.33% 
2 £611 £833 +36.33% 
3 £845 £1,039 +22.96% 
4 £1,113 £1,251 +12.40% 
5 £1,436 £1,527 +6.34% 
6 £1,829 £1,788 -2.24% 
7 £2,264 £2,107 -6.93% 
8 £2,815 £2,529 -10.16% 
9 £3,590 £3,055 -14.90% 
10 (highest) £5,810 £4,636 -20.21% 
 
This might, on the surface, seem inconsistent with the findings presented in Table 1 above, 
which showed that the households with the most children (and therefore with the largest 
McClements score) were in absolute terms poorer than those households with fewer children 
(and therefore using the McClements score would exacerbate the existing disparity). 
However, the reality when looking at all households is that the lower deciles have 
proportionately more single person households whose low incomes will be raised by the 
adjustment, while the higher deciles have more one or two child households whose high 
incomes will be reduced by the adjustment). 
 
Table 3 makes this point abundantly clear. The effect of the McClements adjustment is to 
raise the monthly income figure for no children households by more than six percent, while 
the monthly income figure for households with three or more children is reduced by nearly 
forty percent. From an average monthly income peak of just short of £2,000 for households 
with either no child or just one child, the average monthly income figure drops for two 
children households and plummets for households with three or more children. The link 
between household composition (size) and poverty is thus clearly established. 
 
Table 3 : Distribution of Monthly Household Income by Family Composition : Comparison 
of raw data and  
Number of 
children in 
household 
Number of 
households 
Average monthly 
income (raw data) 
Average monthly 
income (McClements 
adjusted data) 
Percentage gain / 
loss due to 
adjustment 
0 6,298 £1,827 £1,945 +6.46% 
1 1,279 £2,517 £1,996 -20.70% 
2 1,208 £2,582 £1,833 -29.01% 
3 or more 561 £2,441 £1,474 -39.61% 
 
The McClements Scale is not, however, the only scale that is available for researchers to use, 
and the detailed characteristics of whatever scale is adopted will clearly affect the detail of 
the results presented in Table 3. However, provided the scale follows the principle that larger 
households will, ceteris paribus, be higher cost households, the pattern of results will be 
consistent with Table 3. Even when one takes into account the possibility that the cost of 
additional children may be lower due to the ability to use items bought for the eldest child 
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when ‘kitting out’ younger children, this simply reduces rather than eliminates the extra cost 
of larger households. 
 
Once we have calculated McClements Score adjusted monthly household income date, we 
can now turn to the benefit received. We fix the benefit to a household of a free school meal 
at the average cost of a school meal for those children who have to pay for their school meals. 
The Scottish Executive (2004) provided statistics on the cost and take-up of paid-for school 
meals in each of the local education authority areas in Scotland, and from aggregating these 
disaggregated figures we arrived at a Scotland-wide figure of £1.41 per school meal. The 
annual benefit from free school meals was calculated on the basis of five meals per week for 
38 school weeks per year. This annual benefit was then divided by 12 to generate a pro rata 
monthly benefit. To make this data consistent with the monthly income data we applied the 
‘McClements’ scale adjustment to it as well. Thus the monetary levels are all in equivalent 
amounts. In our analyses we implicitly assume that the benefit of free school meals is 
equivalent to the payment to the household of £1.41 for each school day for each child 
between the ages of 5 years and 15 years inclusive. 
 
We recognise that viewing a free school meal as an implicit payment to the household of 
£1.41 can be challenged on the following grounds: 
 
• the cost of producing the meal may not be equal to the price at which it is sold to those 
children who do not get free school meals; education authorities may charge a lower price 
to encourage more healthy eating amongst pupils, or conversely a higher price to offset 
some of the cost of free school meals. 
 
• the welfare returns to meal ‘production’ expenditure in schools may differ from that in the 
household (e.g. due to economies of scale) and therefore the value of the free school meal 
may under-estimate the equivalent cost of production in the home. 
 
• the free school meal is a benefit to the child that cannot be diverted for another use in the 
same way that an income payment could be; thus, a benefit given directly to the child 
may well enhance household welfare more than a monetary payment given to a parent 
(who may not use it to maximise household welfare). 
 
• the benefit of free school meals in our calculations is based on a 100% take-up; every 
child between the ages of 5 and 15 years inclusive will receive 5 free school meals per 
week for 38 weeks per year; in reality truancy / illness, term-time holidays, children not 
in the state sector undertaking home tuition or attending private schooling, and finally and 
perhaps most commonly, parents’ preference for home-produced meals, will all ensure 
that the take-up is less than 100%. 
 
• the £1.41 figure is based on Scottish data, and greater scope for economies of scale may 
result in a lower figure for the UK as a whole. 
 
The net effect of these conflicting potential biases is extremely difficult to ascertain; while 
truancy may be more of a problem amongst poorer households other factors such as ‘quality’ 
may influence decisions of more affluent households. Nevertheless, in the absence of a more 
reliable measure this is the figure that we will utilise. Moreover, it is highly likely that whilst 
a different value may generate somewhat different results, the nature of the analyses we are 
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undertaking will mean that the general conclusions to be drawn from our analyses will remain 
valid. 
 
Now that our McClements Score adjustment to all income data is now complete it is possible 
to assess the impact on the distribution of income of four alternative models for the provision 
of free school meals. The four models of provision are: 
 
Model 1 : No free school meal provision 
 
Model 2 : The current system of free school meal provision based on receipt of Income 
Support or Income-related Job Seekers’ Allowance 
 
Model 3 : A system whereby the children of the poorest x% of households are entitled to free 
school meals 
 
Model 4 : Universal free school meal provision 
 
It should be noted that Models 1 and 4 are special cases of Model 3, specifically, we obtain 
Model 1 from Model 3 when we set x% equal to 0%, and obtain Model 4 from Model 3 when 
we set x% equal to 100%. 
 
IV. The Results 
 
The first stage of our analysis involved a comparison of the welfare gains of Model 2 (the 
current system) and Model 4 (universal provision) compared to the no provision baseline 
(Model 1). The results are presented in Table 4 below. 
 
The second column of Table 4 shows, for each household decile group, the percentage 
income gain arising from the current system based on Income Support and Income-Related 
Job Seekers Allowance.9 It would appear that this system is progressive in nature, with the 
percentage income gains to the household on offer from this system, highlighted by column 
(2), declining as we move up to higher income deciles. 
 
                                                 
9 It might seem strange that under the present free school meals system there is any benefit flowing to affluent 
households such as those in the tenth decile; however, the unit of observation is the household, and a very small 
number of households may include both a wealth family not in receipt of free school meals and poor family that 
is in receipt of free school meals. 
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Table 4 : The income gains of Models 2 and 4 (relative to Model 1) by decile 
Household Decile 
 
(1) 
Gain moving from 
no provision to 
current IS system 
(2)             (3) 
Gain moving from 
current IS system to 
universal system 
(4)              (5) 
Gain moving from 
no provision to 
universal system 
(6)              (7) 
 % £ % £ % £ 
1 (lowest income) 0.5874 1.57 2.1410 5.71 2.7284 7.28 
2 0.5155 3.70 0.4552 3.26 0.9707 6.96 
3 0.2619 2.50 0.3628 3.46 0.6247 5.96 
4 0.0890 1.04 0.4101 4.82 0.4991 5.86 
5 0.0517 0.73 0.4153 5.87 0.4670 6.60 
6 0.0115 0.20 0.3764 6.46 0.3879 6.66 
7 0.0036 0.07 0.3135 6.46 0.3171 6.53 
8 0.0042 0.10 0.2503 6.24 0.2545 6.34 
9 0.0020 0.06 0.1610 5.08 0.1630 5.14 
10 (highest income) 0.0004 0.02 0.0518 2.67 0.0522 2.69 
 
While column 2 shows that the benefit of moving from no provision to the current means-
tested system, measured as a percentage of household income, declines from 0.587% to 
0.0004% of household income as we move from the first through to the tenth household 
decile, column 3 suggests the current system is far less progressive than a measurement based 
upon the percentage change in household income might suggest. Column 3 shows that the 
largest absolute gains (£3.70 per household per month) is for the second decile, while the 
poorest decile receives less help (£1.57 per household per month) than the third decile (£2.50 
per household per month). These results demonstrate that the current system of means-testing 
for free school meals, based on receipt of Income Support or Income-Related Job Seekers 
Allowance, is deeply flawed since many of the poorest households, in decile one, are given 
other benefits and therefore are not eligible for free school meals. Thus, percentage gains 
alone are deeply misleading in the sense that what matters is not only the percentage gains 
but also what these gains are a percentage of. Conclusion 1, therefore, is clear – the current 
system fails many of the most needy. 
 
Columns 6 and 7 show the percentage and absolute benefit gains households receive from a 
universal provision of free school meals (compared to the no provision default) while 
columns 4 and 5 show the increase in benefit this implies over and above the benefits offered 
by the current system. Columns 6 and 7 clearly show that in both absolute and percentage 
terms the biggest gainers from the universal provision of free school meals are those in the 
lowest income levels (deciles 1 and 2). Of equal significance, columns 4 and 5 demonstrate 
that many households in the second and third deciles are also excluded from the current 
system of benefit. Thus we now have Conclusion 2 – it is the very poorest (deciles 1 and 2) 
households that gain the most from universal provision. If we consider the gains from 
universal provision in percentage terms, as seen in column 6, this is also true for the third 
decile. 
 
However, perhaps the most interesting conclusions to be drawn from Table 4 concern the 
results in columns 4 and 5. One argument often made in favour of means-testing, and against 
universality, is that the additional gains resulting from a move from mean-testing to 
universality flow mainly to the better-off ‘middle classes’. It is indeed the case that the fifth, 
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sixth, seventh and eighth deciles receive larger absolute gains than the first decile, with gains 
ranging from £5.87 (fifth decile) through to £6.46 (sixth and seventh deciles) compared to 
‘just’ £5.71 for the first decile. However, the gains for household deciles two and three 
indicate that a significant number of poor households with children, who fail to qualify for 
free school meals due to the restricted mechanism for entitlement, are now also recipients of 
benefits. Thus despite the benefits to wealthier households, columns 4 and 5 nevertheless 
demonstrate that sizeable gains are still flowing to the very poorest in society, particularly 
when viewed in percentage terms (column 4). 
 
Further, a strong case can be made on four grounds that paying a few pounds more to the 
better-off ‘middle’ classes is a price worth paying if it directs significant welfare to the 
poorest households. First, stigma is suggested to play a significant part in reducing the take-
up of free-school meals. In 2002, for example, some 17.6% of entitled children were not 
taking free school meals. The fact that 40.1% of eligible students in secondary schools fail to 
take their free school meal, compared to just 11.4% of eligible students in primary schools, 
suggests that stigma is a significant factor, especially in secondary schools (Scottish 
Executive 2004, Table 2). The Scottish Executive’s Hungry for Success initiative has 
recognised the importance of stigma and has sought to reduce it by attempting to make the 
receipt of free school meals an anonymous process. For example, they have sought to extend 
the introduction of swipe card technology in schools. 
 
Second, the involvement of better-off households in the provision of welfare may well 
introduce a positive externality reflected in debates over the quality of the welfare provided. 
As is well known parental involvement in schools is heavily influenced by background and 
class. Thus, better off families participation in the provision of welfare may well encourage 
the voice of consumers to be heard. 
 
Third, the operation of any system of means-testing involves administrative costs to ensure 
that people not eligible to receive the benefit do not receive it. One perspective on the 
appropriateness of the means-testing follows from a simple cost-benefit analysis – comparing 
the costs of administrating the system with the benefit of having the system (fewer free 
school meals need to be provided). As the eligibility of the system is extended such that it 
gets closer and closer to universality, this simple cost-benefit analysis argues against means-
testing on the basis that fewer and fewer children from better-off homes are being denied free 
school meals. 
 
Finally, the raw figures do not take account of the numbers of households who send their 
children to fee-paying schools, outwith local education authority control, and therefore 
outwith the provision of free school meals. As a result the subsidy to ‘middle’ class families 
is over-estimated, particularly as we move up to the highest income scale. Unfortunately, the 
BHPS does not provide data allowing us to distinguish between households with children 
within, or outwith, the state-provided education system and therefore we include all 
households in the analysis. 
 
The analysis conducted thus far has seen a comparison of the distribution of income across 
households by deciles using models 1, 2 and 4. Only Model 4 (universality) has been shown 
to effectively direct welfare at the poorest household groups. However, though Model 2 (the 
current system based on receipt of Income Support and / or Income-Related Job Seekers’ 
Allowance) has been demonstrated to be a flawed system of means-testing, it does not 
automatically follow that all other potential systems of mean-testing will be equally flawed. 
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Indeed, as Model 3 suggests, a less arbitrary system based on genuine need rather than the 
peculiarities of the UK’s benefits system might result in a much more desirable outcome than 
the current flawed system. 
 
In order to test the validity of this hypothesis we need to reassess the mechanism for 
providing welfare. Model 3 suggests that there may be a mechanism of directing resources in 
order to minimize inequality, such that rather than consider the source of household income 
for benefit entitlement it is the household’s position within the income distribution that 
determines the receipt of welfare. This is much more analogous to attempts at achieving a 
minimum income guarantee. This approach to minimising inequality can be undertaken in 
one of two ways, these differing according to the assumptions made about the size of the 
budget. First, as with the cases of Models 1, 2 and 4, there may be some percentage of the 
population which should receive a constant welfare benefit such that inequality is reduced to 
a minimum, with the budget increasing as entitlement increases (‘variable budget’). The 
second, alternative approach would see the budget for any given welfare system fixed, with 
this budget spread across eligible households in such a way as to minimise the inequality 
between households (‘fixed budget’)10. 
 
To assess the validity of these approaches we need to turn to a measure of household 
inequality, and our preferred measure is the Gini coefficient. The basic premise of Gini 
coefficients is that a smaller Gini coefficient is indicative of a less unequal distribution (see 
Appendix 2 for a fuller discussion on Gini coefficients). The three versions of Model 3 that 
we investigate are: 
 
Model 3a : A variable budget model where a child’s free school meal eligibility is determined 
by their household’s place in the income distribution, and the per-child benefit on offer is 
independent of the total number of eligible children. 
 
Model 3b : A fixed budget model that distributes a budget equal to the current system’s 
budget for free school meals, and thus the per-child benefit on offer is inversely related to the 
total number of eligible children. 
 
Model 3c: A fixed budget model that distributes a budget equal to that required to provide 
free school meals to the children of all households in the first five deciles; this budget, 
approximately twice as generous as that for Model 3b, permits us to see how sensitive the 
results are to a change in the level of the fixed budget. 
 
For each of these three models we calculate new Gini coefficients as we extend eligibility one 
decile at a time, from the no provision scenario (analogous to Model 1 above) to the universal 
scenario (analogous to Model 4 above). 
 
The Gini coefficients in columns 2, 3 and 4 of Table 5 provide an insight into the 
redistributive effects of these three different systems for free school meal provision. As we 
progress down the table the proportion of households eligible for free school meals for school 
age children increases (note that these deciles cover all households, not just those with school 
                                                 
10 In this second approach, the idea that poorer households may receive a higher level of welfare can be more 
readily applied to an income-based benefit than for a benefit in kind, such as free school meals, where it begins 
to lose its meaning somewhat. It would be more problematic for the children of households in receipt of the 
benefit to receive larger benefits as entitlement decreases, though ‘breakfast clubs’, free school meals outwith 
term-time or more nutritional meals could be ways to operationalise this. 
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age children). The first row of results show (for the sake of reference) the Gini coefficients 
obtained for the current system based on the receipt of Income Support or Income-Related 
Job Seekers’ Allowance (based on the budget for that column). 
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Table 5 : Gini coefficients for various severities of means testing 
Household Decile 
Variable budget
 
(2) 
Current system 
budget 
(3) 
50% entitlement 
budget 
(4) 
Current IS system 0.37095 0.37095 0.37045 
0 (no provision) 0.37143 0.37143 0.37143 
1  0.37119 0.37078 0.37011 
2 0.37092 0.37077 0.37009 
3 0.37070 0.37080 0.37015 
4 0.37046 0.37084 0.37022 
5 0.37030 0.37088 0.37030 
6 0.37013 0.37092 0.37039 
7 0.36997 0.37098 0.37050 
8 0.36987 0.37103 0.37061 
9 0.36985 0.37111 0.37077 
10 (universal provision) 0.37001 0.37120 0.37095 
 
By examining column 2 of Table 5 we see how the Gini coefficient changes with a variable 
budget system described in Model 3a. The ‘variable budget’ places no constraints on the 
welfare budget, in other words when you double the number of children eligible for welfare 
you also double the budget. Thus, as we move through the data in column 2, from no deciles 
in receipt of welfare, through to universality, we move from a Gini coefficient of 0.37143 
through to 0.37001, indicating a reduction in inequality across the distribution, though this is 
actually a U-shape with the minimum reached for the ninth decile11. 
 
The U-shaped distribution comes from the fact that as we approach universality giving free 
school meals to the very richest decile gives income the very richest in society and hence 
increases inequality across households. This is indeed an argument against universality in that 
it provides benefit to the ‘middle’ and ‘upper’ classes. However, surprisingly, inequality 
reduces up to and including the eighth and ninth deciles, and it is only for the very richest 
decile that this U shape appears. 
 
Column 3 provides results for Model 3b, which fixes the budget at the level required for the 
current system based on Income Support and Income-Related Job Seekers’ Allowance. Under 
these circumstances, if we double the number of children eligible for free school meals then 
the value of benefit received by each recipient falls by fifty percent. Under this system we see 
two significant results – first, once again we are presented with a U-shaped curve (although 
this time the minimum Gini coefficient occurs for the second decile) and second, the 
minimum Gini coefficient (0.37077 for the second decile) is below the Gini coefficient for 
the current system (0.37095). In other words, welfare needs to be focused on the two lowest 
deciles of the household income distribution to minimise inequality. 
 
                                                 
11 The Gini coefficients presented in this paper were generated with the ineqdeco.ado add-in component for 
Stata v8; when talking about the minimum point in the U-shape of Gini coefficients we limit our discussion to 
deciles rather than percentiles since this add-on component provides Gini coefficients to only five decimal 
places and finding the Gini coefficient-minimising percentile would require a greater number of decimal places 
than five. 
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However, although Model 3b does diminish the inequality seen with the current system, it is 
still the case that under this alternative model some below average income households (from 
the third and fourth deciles, for example), currently in receipt of free school meals (see Table 
4, columns 2 and 3) would be worse off than at present were Model 3b to be adopted. 
 
Finally, column 4, highlights the results of a fixed budget model based upon the budget 
required to fund the 50% entitlement described in Model 3c. This model is a more generous 
level of entitlement than that in Model 3b in that the budget is fixed at the (higher) level 
required to offer free school meals to all the school age children in the first five deciles. The 
results are however similar to those in column 3. Again we see a decline in the Gini 
coefficient up to the second decile, and again a lower Gini coefficient is achieved relative to 
the current system (0.37009 compared to 0.37095) but by the third decile inequality is again 
increasing. 
 
The differences between Models 3a, 3b and 3c fundamentally relate to how we deal with the 
generosity effect. With the variable budget, generosity is directly proportional to the number 
of children in receipt of free school meals, such that generosity rises as more deciles enter 
into eligibility. With the current system budget, however, there is a fixed level of generosity 
that is simply redistributed more thinly as more deciles enter into eligibility; with the 50% 
eligibility budget the same principle applies, though the fixed level of generosity is fixed at a 
higher level (approximately twice the current system level). 
 
Thus, the variable budget method merges both the progressivity and generosity effects, whilst 
both of the fixed budget models hold constant the generosity effect and thus allow us to 
examine the progressivity effect. The variable budget method has the advantage of being 
more realistic by extending the eligibility of welfare, in this case free school meals, which is 
unlikely to be undertaken at the expense of significantly reducing the amount spent on each 
meal, while both fixed budget models have the advantage of focusing on the impact of 
progressivity on extended eligibility. 
 
All three methods provide a U-shaped curve when we graph Gini coefficients against 
eligibility criteria – as we extend eligibility the Gini coefficients (and therefore inequality) 
decline, before picking up again later on. However, the minimum points on these curves do 
differ dramatically. For the variable budget method the minimum Gini coefficient is reached 
with the ninth decile, whilst for the two fixed budget methods the minimum is reached with 
the second decile. Thus, the benefit of enhanced progressivity is reached at the second decile, 
but for the variable budget method the benefit from enhanced generosity exceeds the loss 
from diminished progressivity up to and including the ninth decile, after which the further 
loss of progressivity arising from the giving of free school meals to the school age children of 
the seriously rich outweighs the further generosity effects that such changes would entail, and 
thus the Gini coefficient at last rises again. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
This paper has examined the impact of means-testing on the provision of a single welfare 
provision, namely that of free school meals. It has demonstrated that the current system of 
eligibility fails to deliver welfare to the poorest in society in two ways. First, as Table 4 
demonstrates, many of the poorest households fail to qualify for the benefit and second, as 
Table 5 demonstrates, directing welfare at the poorest households would reduce inequality 
compared to the current system. However, as Table 5 also demonstrates, the paucity of 
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resources for the current system is so marked that devising a more egalitarian method for 
distributing the existing resources would require such a more narrowly-focused system that 
many households, currently in receipt of free school meals, would lose their entitlement and 
thus would be made significantly worse off; though these households generally do not have 
finances as precarious as those of decile one and two households, they would nonetheless be 
unable to suffer this loss of benefit without some difficulty. Thus, not only is the current 
system inefficient in directing resources to the most needy, it can also be argued that it would 
be insufficiently resourced even were it more efficiently operated. 
 
If resourcing is not an issue then a very extensive eligibility should be preferred and, as we 
argued above, there are factors such as stigma and administration costs that suggests that 
universality makes more sense than eligibility up to and including the ninth decile. Certainly, 
the view that universality acts to benefit to the ‘middle’ classes appears grossly overstated. 
The second column of Table 5 suggests only the very richest decile can be considered to be in 
this group. This Table further demonstrates that income inequality is minimised in a universal 
system as opposed to any other targeting method of welfare provision. 
 
This paper has highlighted two further findings. First, Model 3c shows that doubling the level 
of generosity of this particular welfare benefit whilst retaining targeting does not offer much 
scope for extending the assistance on offer to a wider group of recipients. Such is the depth of 
poverty in the poorest with-children households that the most effective use of additional 
resources is to further support the desperately poor households leaving little room for 
additional support for those households who are ‘merely’ very poor. An important reason for 
this result lies in the link (see Tables 1 and 3) between household size and income. Thus, 
larger households are concentrated in the lower income deciles and their higher costs simply 
exacerbate this poverty. Further, if resourcing is an issue, then the rate of eligibility under the 
current system (10.6% of our sample) is woefully too narrow. Our results suggest an 
eligibility rate of at least of 20% might be in order. Choosing this decile for the eligibility cut-
off minimised the Gini coefficient under both of the fixed budget models (3b and 3c)12. 
 
Second, if you are going to have a system of means-testing then it makes sense to design it 
well, rather than rely on the implementation of a system based around the peculiarities of the 
UK social security system. Using the current system’s budget in Model 3b, we note that for 
each of the eligibilities ranging from just one decile all the way up to six deciles, we obtained 
Gini coefficients lower than that for the current system using this same budget (0.37095). 
Thus, in conclusion, regardless of whether one thinks the current system’s budget is adequate 
or desirable, it is hard to conclude that the current system represents anything other than a 
wholly inadequate method of reducing child poverty. 
 
                                                 
12 That the 50% eligibility budget was approximately 105% the current system budget, and yet the minimum 
Gini coefficient was still obtained for the second decile, suggests a degree of stability in this result concerning 
the extent to which eligibility might be extended. 
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Appendix 1 : The McClements Scale 
 
The McClements Scale is based on the notion that the different types of household member 
add different amounts to the cost of living for that household. The household’s McClements 
Score is based on the following values: 
 
Head of household    0.61 
Spouse of head of household   0.39 
First ‘other’ adult    0.46 
Each additional ‘other’ adults   0.36 
Each child >= 13 years, < 16 years  0.27 
Each child >= 11 years, < 13 years  0.25 
Each child >= 8 years, < 11 years  0.23 
Each child >= 5 years, < 8 years  0.21 
Each child >= 2 years, < 5 years  0.18 
Each child less than 2 years   0.09 
 
Thus, a household encompassing two parents plus two children aged nine and six would have 
a McClements Score of 1.44 (0.61+0.39+0.23+0.21). The greater the number of household 
members, and the higher up the above table they tend to appear (there is a slight discontinuity 
involving the head of household’s spouse), the higher is the household’s McClements Score. 
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Appendix 2 : Gini Coefficients 
 
Gini coefficients use a single statistic ranging from 0 (complete equality) to 1 (maximum 
inequality) to represent the inequality seen in a particular variable. Therefore, a lower Gini 
coefficient is indicative of reduced inequality, and if one assumes that reduced income 
inequality, ceteris paribus, enhances society’s welfare, then lowering the Gini coefficient for 
household income can be construed as enhancing society’s welfare. 
 
However, an important point should be noted about Gini coefficients; rather than considering 
each value of the variable in the context of the entire distribution of that variable, each value 
is simply considered in terms of its position relative to the adjacent values in the distribution 
for that variable. If the highest-earning person in the world has some of their income taken 
away from them, then society is more equal because the second-highest-earning person in the 
world is no longer as poor relative to the person one place above them in the income 
distribution. This aspect of the statistic has implications when considering why two different 
distributions have different Gini coefficients – how do we decompose the change? 
 
The change in Gini coefficients (∆G) when we move from one free school meals system to 
another can be decomposed into the following effects: 
 
∆G = -((∆P × ∆B) – R)       {Eqn 1} 
 
Where ∆P is the change in progressivity, ∆B is the change in benefits on offer (‘generosity’) 
and R is the re-ranking effect. Thus, a move to either a more progressive system or a more 
generous system will have the effect of reducing the Gini coefficient, though this reduction 
can be offset by re-ranking of people in the distribution. 
 
Using the current example of income distribution, re-ranking occurs where the provision of 
additional benefits to one person raises them above the person above them in the income 
distribution; in extreme cases, and depending on the additional benefits offered and the initial 
difference in income, this provision of additional benefits can result in an increase in absolute 
income for the initially-poorer person but little or no change in the Gini co-efficient; in most 
cases the re-ranking effect offsets only some of the progressivity and generosity effects. 
 
The relevance of this to our study is that to the extent that poor with-children households rise 
above poor without-children households in the income distribution when we change the free 
school meals system, some of the real benefit of the change is not recognised because the re-
ranking effect diminishes the change in the Gini coefficient, thus understating the welfare-
enhancing effect of the change in the system. 
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